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Abstract 
Recent theoretical discussions have indicated that citizenship is not only a way of being, but also a way of behaving. 
This article aims to show how attempts to regulate the behaviour of the citizenry can introduce a new topography of in-
clusion and exclusion, thereby exercising a direct effect on particular ethnic minorities. We investigate the issue in Ant-
werp, the largest city of the Flemish Region in Belgium. With his slogan ‘Antwerp belongs to everyone’ former mayor 
Patrick Janssens gained significant international attention for Antwerp’s supposedly inclusive conception of urban citi-
zenship. In this article, we argue that the universality of Antwerp’s city slogan has nevertheless veiled the introduction 
of new exclusionary prescriptions centred around citizens’ conduct. Drawing on a Foucauldian account of power, three 
different modes of policing are discussed that have rearticulated the boundaries of urban citizenship in Antwerp. The 
disciplinary, bio-political and etho-political techniques of power each show in a different way attempts by the state to 
steer and effectively regulate what counts as appropriate conduct. As a corollary of governmental power, particular 
ways of behaving have been labelled as deviant and abnormal, thus rendering full citizenship conditional on a set of 
substantial expectations on how to perform as a citizen. As these expectations are only apparently neutral with respect 
to ethnic identities, a tension arose between the city’s universal and inclusive rhetoric and its particular and exclusion-
ary policies. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2008 Patrick Janssens, the mayor of Antwerp, Flan-
ders’ largest city, was shortlisted for the World Mayor 
Award. His nomination represented a landslide change 
in the city’s international reputation, which had deteri-
orated ever since it had become the hotbed for the 
Flemish ultra-right-wing party Vlaams Blok in the 1990s 
and what has been labelled to be ‘Muslim riots’ in the 
early 2000s (De Decker, Kesteloot, De Maesschalk, & 
Vranken, 2005; Swyngedouw, 2000). By 2003, the ina-
bility of authorities to regain control over the city came 
to a climax when the entire municipal government re-
signed after a corruption scandal involving some of its 
 Social Inclusion, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 3, Pages 18-28 19 
leading politicians. The socialist politician Patrick 
Janssens then entered the scene as the new mayor, 
announcing a different political future for the city. To 
counter the widespread image of a highly ‘divided city’, 
he immediately launched a new slogan which was to 
embody Antwerp’s identity for years to come: ‘The city 
belongs to everyone.’ 
The city slogan gained significant international at-
tention for its supposedly inclusive conception of urban 
citizenship. Compared with the divisive political pro-
gram of the extreme right it indeed explicitly distanced 
itself from any legal exclusion of unwanted persons. 
However, in this article we want to raise some critical 
questions about what it means for the city to belong to 
everyone. We argue that the universality of Antwerp’s 
slogan has in fact veiled the introduction of a set of 
new exclusionary prescriptions that define what citi-
zenship is and who belongs to the city. In our interpre-
tation some policy measures expect the behaviour of 
citizens to correspond to the standard of the ‘good citi-
zen’. Yet this often also tends to exclude a range of in-
dividuals, often the most vulnerable categories in soci-
ety like homeless people, immigrants, tenants, or poor 
people. Rather than being excluded legally, they risk 
being degraded to a form of second-class citizenship.  
In the field of Urban Politics many authors have ap-
proached the issue of contemporary societal exclusion 
from the perspective of who factually runs the city 
(Smith & McQuarrie, 2012). The general argument is 
that those who remain at the margins of the political 
power structure will be excluded from the city in vari-
ous ways. Separate bodies of research have therefore 
looked into the distribution of power over gentrifica-
tion (Smith, 1998), public space (Mitchell, 2005), home-
lessness (De Verteuil, 2006) and migrant policies (Uiter-
mark, Rossi, & Van Houtum, 2005) across many cities. 
Even though the Urban Politics approach is valuable 
in its own right, it has overemphasized the question of 
who is responsible for exclusionary policies, at the ex-
pense of understanding how these policies factually 
exclude people. In addition, research somewhat lost 
sight of the broader connection between several exclu-
sionary policies. Discussions on ‘the right to the city’ 
(Marcuse, 2009) or the ‘just city’ (Fainstein, 2010) have 
pointed in general to the exclusionary effects intrinsic 
to the contemporary capitalist city, yet they suffer 
from an analytical deficiency to account for the specific 
nature of different forms of exclusion.  
This article will therefore draw on a Foucauldian 
reading of power techniques to complement the domi-
nant perspective on who is responsible for exclusionary 
citizenship policies. Foucault (1988; 2004) approaches 
power from a ‘depersonalized’ perspective whereby 
who is in power is not of foremost importance. His 
work is therefore well-suited to discuss how the gov-
ernmental reach of the state tries to steer and effec-
tively regulate the behaviour of its citizens. It is espe-
cially useful to distinguish the underlying rationale and 
structure of power techniques that regulate who 
counts as a citizen and who doesn’t.  
We begin this article with a theoretical sketch of 
the distinction between a classic Marshallian approach 
to citizenship and a Foucauldian approach. Then we 
will discuss three different case studies that each illus-
trate a distinct power technique regulating the bound-
aries of urban citizenship. While the three illustrations 
only focus on the city of Antwerp, the theoretical lev-
erage of the analysis is much broader. As scholars 
working in the field of Urban Politics have extensively 
shown, exclusionary policies are popping-up across the 
globe. This paper is a first attempt to classify the na-
ture of these policies building on a Foucauldian take on 
power. To conclude, we will show how the different 
power techniques are interconnected and add up to a 
new urban topography of in- and exclusion. 
2. The Political Construction of Citizenship  
2.1. The Renaissance of Citizenship: from Being to 
Behaving  
Sociological research on citizenship has long been in-
spired by T.H. Marshall’s (1963[1998]) account of ‘Citi-
zenship and Social Class’. At the dawn of the era of the 
European welfare state, he argued that the relation-
ship between citizens and the state had gone through a 
natural process of rights extension. Distinguishing be-
tween three periods, Marshall saw the rise of formal-
ized citizenship in the 18th century when the state be-
came the protector of civil rights such as free speech, 
in exchange for complying with civil duties such as pay-
ing taxes. In the 19th century, a second rights dimen-
sion was added: (some) citizens obtained political 
rights, enabling them to legitimately elect representa-
tives. Finally, social rights were added to the bundle in 
the middle of the 20th century, as the state obtained 
responsibility over the welfare of its citizens. Sociologi-
cal research subsequently showed that the bundle of 
civil, social and political rights varied depending on the 
type of welfare state or political system. 
In the late 1990s, research on citizenship experi-
enced a sudden renaissance (Isin & Turner, 2007), 
mainly due to the rise of the ‘active’ welfare state. The 
Marshallian approach seemed unable to understand 
how states could regulate the behaviour of their citi-
zenry without modifying the bundle of rights. It be-
came increasingly clear that Marshall had only grasped 
the juridico-political dimension of citizenship. For au-
thors like Nikolas Rose (2000), Barry Hindess (2000), 
Mike Raco (2003), Engin Isin (2002) and Willem 
Schinkel (2010) however, citizenship was a more com-
plex phenomenon.  
These authors argued that citizenship is not only a 
legal status granted to individuals, but also entails a set 
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of expectations on how to behave as a citizen. A cen-
tral source of inspiration to understand this ‘cultural-
ized’ dimension of citizenship was the work of Michel 
Foucault. As Olson (2008) summarizes, the Foucauldian 
approach to citizenship shares the “claim that citizen-
ship is not simply a legal status conferring political 
rights and obligations, but one that additionally shapes 
identities and forms of subjectivity. Here citizenship 
not only certifies political membership, but more pro-
foundly serves as a means of social differentiation and 
of fabricating interests, opinions, and preferences.” 
(2008, p. 40).  
The Foucauldian approach importantly shed new 
light on the principles of inclusion and exclusion from 
citizenship (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1996). For Mar-
shall and his followers the distinction between citizens 
and non-citizens was unambiguous and formalized: ex-
clusion from the political community implied the sub-
duction of membership status or the restriction of 
rights and duties. Foucauldian scholars saw citizenship 
as ‘conditional’ and ‘virtual’ (Schinkel, 2010). Apart 
from a juridico-legal sense of belonging, citizens are of-
ten asked to ‘perform’ certain expected behaviour as a 
condition to become a full citizen. Exclusion from the 
political community then occurs when formally recog-
nized members do not comply with the required be-
haviour of the ‘good citizen’. 
This is the point where ‘ethnicity’ enters the pic-
ture. At least since Fredrik Barth’s (1969) classical 
work, scholars have been at pains to emphasize the 
cultural nature of ethnicity. As Malešević (2004, p. 4) 
argued recently, ethnicity is now generally understood 
as “(…) a social relation in which social actors perceive 
themselves and are perceived by others as being cul-
turally distinct collectivities”. The logical consequence 
is that, in contemporary societies, ethnicity is policed 
primarily through cultural conceptions of citizenship—
that is, through policy measures enforcing norms of 
ideal behaviour, in the process shaping citizens’ identi-
ties and subjectivities. In the cases discussed in this ar-
ticle (see Section 3) we will focus more particularly on 
how policy measures which appear to be ethnically 
neutral, nevertheless have direct consequences for 
very particular ethnic groups organized around modes 
of behaviour constitutive for their identities. 
To understand how ethnicity is being policed today, 
we therefore need to focus on the instruments that 
governments have developed to steer citizens’ con-
duct, their ways of life and the experience of their 
identities. According to Foucault, these advanced 
‘power techniques’ are distinct from sovereign power 
instruments in the sense that they do not use physical 
force, such as incarceration or bodily violence. Instead 
of physically repressing its subjects, the power tech-
niques that regulate the daily behaviour of citizens de-
pend on the latter’s cooperation to understand and 
comply with the requisite behaviour. Citizens are se-
duced to identify with the state and its demands be-
cause these are portrayed as rational and in the best 
interest of the individual. Ultimately the exercise of 
these types of power tries to annul itself: citizens 
should internalize the requisite habitus as natural. 
Those who fail to comply, are not threatened with ju-
ridical exclusion from the community, but risk being 
stigmatized within the boundaries of the state. Their 
citizenship becomes second-rate because they do not 
comply with the hegemonic view on society.  
The main advantage of such a Foucauldian ap-
proach is that it enables an in-depth analysis of the 
power techniques used to ‘police’ the cultural dimen-
sions of citizenship, which are crucial to understand 
how ethnicities are policed today. On the other hand, 
this approach’s main weakness is that some of the 
boundaries usually drawn between forms of exclusion 
are increasingly blurred. Most research on social exclu-
sion is indeed differentiated with respect to the sub-
stantial ‘identity’ of its subjects (e.g. class, ethnicity, 
gender,…). In other words, while using a Foucauldian 
approach enables us to analyse the instruments with 
which ethnicity is being policed, it no longer allows us 
to distinguish sharply between the policing of ethnicity 
and, for instance, class and gender. In many cases, as 
we will demonstrate further below, these exclusionary 
techniques operate identically for different groups of 
subjects. In the following section, we will therefore 
shortly elaborate on three such power techniques.  
2.2. Three Power Techniques 
The regulation of citizens’ conduct can take on a multi-
plicity of forms dispersed over many societal domains. 
Despite this variety, Foucault has tried to organize 
them into more generic types, in particular ‘disciplinary 
power’ and ‘bio-politics’ of the population (sometimes 
also referred to as the power of security).  
Disciplinary power is composed of a set of tech-
niques that are aimed at subjecting an individual to a 
particular code of conduct (Foucault, 2001). The use of 
this type of power is highly localized in specific institu-
tions (e.g. clinics, prisons or schools). The internal 
structure of these institutions regulates the spontane-
ous behaviour of individual persons. In the context of 
the active welfare state, for instance, we think of the 
power exercised by public employment services. The 
unemployed are expected to register at regular inter-
vals at the employment office to report on their activi-
ties of job-seeking. The take-up of their social rights is 
thereby made conditional on their collaboration with 
the employment service. Although repressive sanctions 
do exist, the ultimate goal of service providers is quali-
tatively different: they want to educate people and 
strengthen their labour skills. Compliance is mainly as-
sured by convincing subjects that it is in their best in-
terest to find a job. Employment agencies thus pro-
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mote the meritocratic ideal in which happiness and so-
cietal prestige derive from income and work. This pro-
ductive power over subjects operates according to the 
principle of the norm. This means that it evaluates in-
dividual progression against a common standard. So if 
most people need three months to apply for a job, eve-
ryone should. As a result, people who do not fit the 
norm, for example because there is little demand for 
their specific expertise, are stigmatized as unwilling to 
work.  
The second power type, bio-politics of the popula-
tion, is less tied to specific institutions (Foucault, 1984). 
Instead, it aims to establish order in a community in its 
totality, that is, across institutional boundaries. Rather 
than regulating the conduct of individual persons ac-
cording to a norm, this power type is exercised over cit-
izens as a ‘population’. It starts out from a specific view 
on what a ‘normal’ population should look like, and 
tries to identify the necessary parameters to change 
from the existing distribution of citizens to a normal 
one (Foucault, 2008). In our earlier example of the ac-
tive welfare state measures to counter the ‘unem-
ployment trap’ give a good illustration of bio-political 
control. Often the surplus income of work is very mea-
gre for the low-skilled unemployed, dissuading them to 
look for a job. Many people consider this to be an ab-
normality in the social security system. Lowering bene-
fits might be a parameter for the system to restore its 
balance. Again, this normalization can entail serious 
exclusionary consequences, for example in establishing 
the so-called ‘working poor’.  
Foucault’s power typology is historical, which means 
that it remains principally open to new types of power. 
In this respect, authors have so far highlighted one ad-
ditional type. Rose (2000, p. 1399) distinguished a new 
‘politics of behaviour’ called ‘etho-politics’: “If disci-
pline individualizes and normalizes and bio-power ag-
gregates and socializes, etho-power works through the 
values, beliefs, and sentiments thought to underpin the 
techniques of responsible self-government and the 
manifestation of one’s obligations.” Etho-politics dig 
deeper into what Raco (2009) has called the ‘existential 
dimension’ of citizenship. Just like disciplinary power it 
‘individualizes’ a political subject, yet it does not oper-
ate in a special place or institution, and it can be exer-
cised virtually anywhere and at any time. A good exam-
ple is the possibility to take into account a broad range 
of private information, often distributed through social 
media, to evaluate people’s claims on social benefits. 
The possibility of permanently controlling private con-
duct is used to encourage citizens to reflect on their 
public ethos, and to behave as the norms prescribe.  
Important in this account of the power techniques 
is that they do not exclude one another: “So, there is 
not a series of successive elements, the appearance of 
the new causing the earlier one to disappear. There is 
not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age 
of security. (…) In reality you have a series of complex 
edifices in which (…) what above all changes is the 
dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of 
correlation (…)” (Foucault, 2007, p. 8). This implies that 
repressive sovereign techniques often accompany 
techniques aimed at the regulation of behaviour. Nev-
ertheless, the way in which these techniques link up 
and are discursively legitimated can take many forms. 
Foucault coined the neologism ‘governmentality’ or 
‘governmental rationality’ to refer to the overall con-
struction of power over citizens as individuals and as a 
population.  
To sum up, we can say that our theoretical ap-
proach draws on the insight that citizenship implies 
more than a mere legal relationship, it also entails a 
cultural dimension. Inspired by Foucault, we distinguish 
different techniques of power that the state can em-
ploy to substantively regulate the conduct of its citizen-
ry. As a correlate of this, different modes of conduct 
appear as abnormal and do not receive full recognition 
in society. 
3. Antwerp, a City that Belongs to Everyone?  
The remainder of this article will reconstruct in detail 
how Antwerp’s municipal government developed its 
own conception of urban citizenship between 2003 and 
2012, a period in which the city was governed by a so-
cialist-led coalition. We focus mainly on three sets of 
policy measures which gave rise to tense public de-
bates because of their implications for particular 
groups of subjects, not in the least for ethnic minori-
ties. First, we reconstruct the factual origins and official 
goals of each of the policy measures. For this purpose, 
we draw on in-depth interviews, public policy docu-
ments, Community Council minutes and statistics from 
municipal and regional authorities. Secondly, we pro-
pose to interpret the policy measures as illustrations of 
the three Foucauldian power techniques discussed 
above, i.e. the disciplinary, bio-political and etho-
political power techniques. With the help of our theo-
retical framework, we try to enrich our understanding 
of these measures’ general rationale and functioning of 
these policy measures, thus linking it with the city’s 
emerging conception of citizenship. From this we de-
rive whether and how new boundaries of exclusion 
arose. While it is not our aim to evaluate or criticize 
these policy measures, we do seek to lay bare these 
measures’ exclusionary effects.  
As a result, our interpretative reading shows clear 
affinities to Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (Mitchell, 
2009), by focussing on the disarticulated practical ef-
fects of official policies and its legitimations. We do not 
contend our interpretation of the policy measures to 
be exhaustive, but the Foucauldian lens should offer a 
way to recast the rhetorical force of city marketing by 
critically asking what it means to live in a city that pre-
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sents itself as ‘inclusive’. 
3.1. Disciplinary Power and the Neutrality of Service 
Provision 
On March 7, 2007 Antwerp’s municipality introduced a 
dress code for city staff, which became better known 
as the ‘headscarf ban in public functions’. Nonetheless, 
in its original formulation the guideline did not mention 
any garments in particular. It merely defended a gen-
eral ban on all ‘External symbols of ideological, politi-
cal, syndical, sportive,… belief” for city staff working in 
direct contact with the public (City of Antwerp, 2007a). 
The dress code was experienced however by the Mus-
lim community of Antwerp as a restriction of the basic 
individual freedom of religion. A Women’s activist 
group called BOOH! (Boss Over Own Head) was estab-
lished by a group of Muslimahs who defended the right 
to always wear a headscarf. At regular intervals they 
organized protest, catching the attention of local and 
national media alike.  
In his book The Best Is Yet to Come, it was mayor 
Patrick Janssens (2006, p. 134) himself who had advo-
cated a ban on all ideological signs for city staff: “de-
spite my understanding, it is not appropriate to author-
ize the headscarf (or any other religious or political 
symbol) while exercising a public function, which has to 
visually express the neutrality of the government.” The 
headscarf ban was just one of the measures in a broader 
attempt to guarantee the secular nature of the state. 
Another measure for instance consisted in not authoriz-
ing religious people to perform prayers at work.  
Many of the politicians from Moroccan or Turkish 
decent in the socialist party and in the coalition parties 
resented the measure as a stigmatization of religious 
minorities. Janssens’ original rationale to guarantee the 
political neutrality of the city was therefore subse-
quently complemented with the pragmatic policy goal 
to help support an ethnically mixed recruitment policy. 
Since the 1990s the municipality had tried to make the 
city staff more ethnically heterogeneous, but with little 
result so far. With the dress code, it was said that the 
resistance among the broader population to a mixed 
city staff would gradually diminish. Nevertheless, this 
resulted in a governmental paradox; while the aim was 
to make the city staff into a reflection of the ethnic di-
versity in the urban society, religious diversity as such 
should not be visible in front-office functions. 
In our view, this first policy measure can be identi-
fied as a disciplinary power technique. The exercise of 
disciplinary power is quite common in professional set-
tings, as it certifies that employees fulfil the general 
aims of a company. Still, a more symbolic issue was at 
stake in the context of city staff: the secular, neutral 
representation of the state and the political community 
as such was the main driver for the policy measure. 
The dress code then became the norm against which 
each individual civil servant’s appearance needed to be 
evaluated. As we will now explain, this inevitably im-
plied the construction of a new exclusionary fault-line 
of citizenship.  
The municipal government considered it legitimate 
to make the basic freedom of religion conditional in 
order to guarantee the secular nature of the state. As 
Council Member Cathy Berx argued: “We have to learn 
to cope with diversity, but also with the predicaments 
of our democratic system of law. These state that fun-
damental rights and freedoms, like the right to free 
speech and the freedom of religion, are not absolute 
basic rights, and negotiations need to be made, in par-
ticular in the case of the neutrality of the public ser-
vice.” (City of Antwerp, 2007b, p. 1721) So it was in the 
defence of a specific secular interpretation of universal 
citizenship that certain basic laws were denied to a 
subset of citizens.  
The municipality stigmatized any refusal to comply 
with the dress-code as a sign of immature citizenship 
and religious fanaticism. As mayor Janssens (2006) put 
it: “In such a situation, the employee needs to be ma-
ture enough to choose for the neutrality of his function 
instead of being loyal to an absolute belief.” (2006, p. 
134) Put differently, the norm of the dress code estab-
lished a political fault-line between those who could deal 
with religion in a mature way and those who could not.  
The municipal government denied that it wanted to 
extend this norm outside the confines of its institution-
al boundaries. For mayor Janssens, “the headscarf and 
other religious symbols are not forbidden in Antwerp 
(…). We only ask for people to take off their symbols 
during their public job.” (City of Antwerp, 2007c, p. 64) 
Again this is common for disciplinary power: the disci-
plinary norm is organically bound up with the institu-
tional context in which it originated and cannot travel 
freely outside its original context. However, when a 
government promotes a disciplinary measure, govern-
mental norms tend to inspire other institutional con-
texts and contaminate them. It is the legitimacy of the 
state which strengthens institutional ‘mirroring’. 
In fact, this is what happened in the case of the 
headscarf ban; suddenly it started to trickle down in 
other public services as well. For example, in public 
day-care centres employees were forbidden to wear a 
headscarf. But also in public schools the fault-line was 
drawn, forcing young Muslim women to stop wearing 
headscarves at school. What started out as an institu-
tional norm thus grew into a broader imagination of 
the public tolerance for religious diversity. In the origi-
nal context of the city administration women with a 
headscarf were offered back-office jobs, but the sym-
bolical effect was unprecedented. The establishment of 
the widely supported BOOH! was one of the clear indi-
cations that religious migrant minorities felt stigma-
tized and relegated to a second-class, merely formal 
citizenship in the urban political community. 
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3.2. Bio-Politics and the Normalization of Urban 
Neighbourhoods  
During Janssens’ term as mayor of Antwerp, the munic-
ipal administration transformed into an apparatus that 
aimed to increasingly influence the composition of its 
urban population. The objective was twofold: more 
better-off people had to live in the city and the number 
of poor people had to decrease. In this paragraph we 
discuss the means and the strategies by which this two-
sided concern was set into motion. In our view, both 
strategies illustrate the functioning of a bio-political 
technique that aims to regulate and effectively normal-
ize who lives where. We discuss how the attraction of 
better-off people became part and parcel of Antwerp’s 
loudly approved urban renewal policy, whereas reduc-
ing the number of poor inhabitants in the inner city 
remained a silent process. The latter took the form of 
backstage agreements between administrators and lo-
cal politicians. From 2008 on, this silent Antwerp ex-
periment became more or less official legislation in the 
Flanders Region: from then on a system of technically 
refined parameters ‘proved’ that a certain percentage 
of poor inhabitants was the sufficient justification for a 
deliberate freeze in the social housing supply. A vast 
majority of these urban poor were immigrants, people 
to whom both ownership and the better equipped 
rented houses remained unattainable (Vaneste, 2007). 
Let us now return to the more publicly visible as-
pect of these policy measures, the attempt to attract 
specific high-profile groups to the city, such as dual 
earners, higher income groups, and young families. The 
Municipal Coalition Plan repeatedly identified them as 
target groups whose presence would help create a bet-
ter functioning and bustling city: “The municipality 
wants to get more young people into the city. Firstly 
young families with children and baby boomers coming 
from the suburbs. Therefore high-standard urban living 
is one of the major tasks for this policy term and the 
years to come.” (City of Antwerp, 2007d, p. 3) This en-
deavour was attached to the Municipal Spatial Struc-
ture Plan, a document indicating the strategic interven-
tions to be made. Under Janssens’ administration, this 
Plan was used more systematically to integrate new 
housing in urban renewal projects. This endeavour was 
rather new for Flanders as most of its real estate pro-
jects are developed almost without prior urban design 
or planning. The Antwerp Coalition Plan completed its 
focal objective with a bulk of interventions in the do-
main of arts and culture, education, shopping and 
nightlife inter alia, in order to become the ‘bustling 
city’ where youngsters, young adults and young fami-
lies like to live (City of Antwerp, 2007d, pp. 3, 17, 27). 
Taking its own apparatus and governance tech-
niques into account, the Coalition Plan noted that 
‘good and goal-oriented governance’ was the best way 
to rejuvenate Antwerp’s ‘leadership and its leading 
character. By showing that bigger towns like ours have 
to offer a lot of fascinating things, to young families 
with children as well’ (City of Antwerp, 2007d). The 
Janssens’ administration took a leading role in the de-
regulation of older business models by reshuffling mu-
nicipal departments into corporate units and granting 
specific administrations extensive autonomy, such as 
the planning department. This has been instrumental 
in attracting substantial funds for big strategic renewal 
projects. The former retirement fund of Antwerp was 
converted into the real estate and urban development 
company Vespa. Vespa became capable of intervening 
in local housing markets and in this way acted upon 
important parameters that influence the composition 
of the urban population. Vespa was said to influence 
the supply and demand of existing and new housing, 
inter alia by intentionally buying and selling land prop-
erties and buildings on specific locations (e.g. disadvan-
taged neighbourhoods, ragged areas and/or newly de-
signed districts). 
The second part of the case we discuss here, deals 
with the overall reduction of social housing opportuni-
ties in Antwerp, especially in the city centre’s social 
rental sector. Between 2004 and 2012 the number of 
socially rented dwellings decreased by nine percent in 
the city, some districts showed an even bigger decline. 
This reduction was achieved by demolishing older 
dwellings, assembling formerly individual apartments, 
freezing programs for new social houses, and selling so-
cial parcels to commercial companies. In some remote 
neighbourhoods however, new social housing projects 
were started nevertheless (e.g. in the harbour district far 
north). From 2005 on, the social housing companies did 
not initiate any major project in the city centre, and 
when some smaller corporations did apply for such pro-
jects, they received a municipally disapprobation.  
Although Antwerp did not deploy income policies for 
new residents (as Rotterdam for instance did), the city 
did try to interfere in its demographic composition, es-
pecially by reducing its lowest socioeconomic segments, 
many coming from an immigrant background. The ad-
ministrative parameters to do so were prepared and 
composed from 2003 onwards, and since 2008 the Ant-
werp dispersion policy for rental housing in the public 
sector became largely standard policy in Flanders. From 
then on, the municipality had more legal and technical 
instruments to freeze or decrease the number of social 
housing in specific neighbourhoods where the rate of 
social (rental) housing was considered to be too high.  
The legal framework provided refined techniques to 
calculate the precise number of rented social housing 
in each statistical sector. These parameters created the 
illusion that the considerations to be made were purely 
technical instead of societal or political. This opinion 
seems to be illustrated by casting an eye on the state-
ments and discussions in the Flemish Parliament on 
this selective and area-bound public housing policy. 
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The preparation and establishment of this legislation 
was discussed in terms of risks for the real estate sec-
tor and the deliberate reduction of socially rented 
housing stock in the inner cities itself was not discussed 
as a matter of public interest.  
Today experts in the social housing sector are critical 
on this issue. Gert Eyckmans, managing director of a 
smaller housing corporation in the Antwerp region, noti-
fies that especially in the districts and neighbourhoods 
with high rates of social housing, the public sector 
should remain present and sometimes even increase its 
activities. “The mere technical calculations veil what in 
the near future will be needed in these neighbourhoods. 
As urban demography will rise, these districts in fact will 
need even more dwellings in the public sector. A great 
deal depends on how one positions the referential val-
ues decisive to whether one increases or decreases the 
supply”. In this context Janssens’ policy was quite differ-
ent compared to that of other cities where corporations 
and the city administration decided to remain present in 
these neighbourhoods. 
Combined, the two dimensions of the policy in-
stalled a new topography of in- and exclusion. As af-
fordability of private rental housing is growing weaker 
in Flanders, the public rental sector functions as a shel-
ter for urban tenants, especially for people with low in-
comes (Winters & Elsinga, 2008). This precarity is even 
fiercer for ethnic minorities for whom tenant proper-
ties in the private sector are often unaffordable be-
cause of repeatedly reported discrimination by land-
lords (for an overview, see Özüerken & Van Kempen, 
2003). Due to the silent and technocratic relocation of 
social housing however, poor people are ‘in a natural 
way’ displaced to the urban periphery where they 
symbolically live through their second-rate citizenship. 
Still they remain dependent on amenities in the inner 
city, and as social workers and grass-roots associations 
report, poor people perceive the new suburban envi-
ronments often as inadequate, especially in terms of 
social networks. By contrast, the inner-city tends to be-
come a purified domain, a place for leisure and con-
sumption, a realm for middle- and upper-class resi-
dents. The neighbourhoods where the decrease in 
social housing was most dramatic were often those dis-
tricts that functioned as an arrival city for immigrant 
newcomers, a particularly obvious example being the 
area around the central railway station, where a large 
renewal program was deployed. This reshuffling of ur-
ban functions, combining the restyling of urban areas 
with an implicit regulation of who lives where, can be 
conceived as a bio-political intervention on the defini-
tion of urban citizenship.  
3.3. Etho-Politics and the Regulation of Behaviour in 
Public Spaces  
As a third case, we discuss Antwerp’s local security pol-
icies, focussing on the Local Administrative Penalties 
(LAP’s). In short, LAP is a system of administrative fines 
that remains outside the regular court-handling of 
sanctions. During Janssens’ term, the LAP’s became the 
corner stone of the so-called ‘integrated security poli-
cy’. We argue that these fines can be interpreted as a 
specific etho-political power instrument. The LAP sys-
tem was initially designed to identify and re-educate 
youngsters and individuals behaving inappropriately in 
public spaces. As the system was designed to re-
integrate these individuals, experts considered it to be 
generally inclusive (Devroe, 2010). In its implementa-
tion, however, the system thereby drew new lines of 
exclusion, as citizens relying on public spaces for daily 
activities had to face new and unknown regulations, 
and particular areas housing ethnic minorities were 
subjected to close attention and behavioural control, 
especially with respect to these minorities’ youngsters.  
At the end of 2004 the Antwerp municipality pre-
sented its ‘Plan Safety’, a master plan in the struggle 
against urban decay, petty crime and what was 
phrased as ‘problems of quality of life’, e.g. noise nui-
sances, dirt in public space or dog waste on the side-
walks. The approach was said to be ‘integral’ as civil 
servants started a systematic collaboration with social 
workers, police forces and juridical officials. Through 
new forms of ‘assertive outreaching’ the administra-
tion wanted to make house calls, focusing on hard-to-
reach groups and multi-problem families. An important 
strand of the approach was oriented towards young 
adults and early offenders, most of them belonging to 
ethnic minorities. Night-shops and non-profit gathering 
places for immigrants would be followed more strin-
gently than before because they were suspected of be-
ing involved in drug trade and causing public nuisance. 
The bulk of measures was supplemented by actions 
bound to migrant concentration neighbourhoods and 
specific target groups (under aged immigrant offenders 
with no criminal record).  
New forms of mediation and early intervention 
were developed. Municipal cleaning and restoration 
campaigns were set up, involving both city services and 
neighbourhood residents. The ‘Plan Safety’ did not yet 
entail administrative (financial) sanctions. Its reach was 
broader and encompassed a wide range of programs 
and counselling instruments aimed at supporting both 
victims and perpetrators of nuisance, while using these 
programmes for building up a local policy-relevant da-
tabase. The programme was monitored citywide, ena-
bling the mayor to request immediate interventions. 
Nevertheless, all these local programmes and interven-
tions remained curative or preventive, as for most of-
fenses there were no repressive municipal instruments.  
On the national level however, the idea became 
dominant that municipalities should indeed be able to 
act repressively. Local authorities and particularly 
mayors should be able to punish small offences, such 
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as noise nuisance and illegal dumping. By establishing a 
financial fine instead of a legal prosecution, a double 
logic could be installed: petty criminality would no 
longer remain unpunished, and prosecutors’ caseload 
would be diminished, thus creating time for dealing 
with serious offences. The installation of the LAP’s was 
said to be a form of de-penalisation, a rather veiling la-
bel as the offending citizens were still being punished 
while no longer protected by ordinary juridical rights 
and procedures.  
However, in order to make these federal LAP legis-
lations locally applicable, municipalities had to organize 
a complex of new regulations and implementations: 
new civil servant functions had to be created, a list of 
punishable offences had to be compiled, and these 
new regulations had to be integrated with existing local 
practices. Moreover, a mediating organism and proce-
dure had to be installed, as the federal law on LAP’s 
guaranteed that the suspected offender could appeal 
to a mediator.  
What types of behaviour did the LAP legislation 
consider to be offences? The national legislator only 
indicated the general types of acts and situations that 
were apt for local fines, in the sense that classic penal 
procedures no longer applied. The majority of the legis-
lative energy was mobilized for the technical de-
penalisation, rather than reflecting on the implications 
of the radical shift in criminal justice and its implemen-
tation. Major aspects of the latter now became the 
sole responsibility of mayors and their municipal coun-
cils. Moreover, the de-penalisation created a hyper lo-
calized legislation, with town-based regulations, some-
times comprising up to 200 pages listing offensive 
actions.  
When the LAP’s were implemented and the new 
apparatus became operational, something paradoxical 
happened, at least in Antwerp. The procedure proved 
to be a lot easier than the more refined interventions 
and campaigns from the initial ‘Plan Safety’. Small of-
fences were being fined massively, and in some parts 
of the town problems indeed seemed to diminish. Civil 
society discussed the logic used to determine what 
counted as an offence, and who was to be suspected of 
such offences. The officials declaring the offences were 
small in number, but since they were not uniformed, 
they were ubiquitous and invisible. These peculiar fea-
tures, we argue, made the LAP into an etho-political 
power tool.  
As in the first two cases, these fines tried to regu-
late citizens’ behaviour. In the case of Antwerp, the 
LAP’s had a wide-ranging impact on the power rela-
tions between citizens and their political communities. 
Because the decision determining what counts as an 
offence was now taken at a local level, local actors be-
came increasingly able to influence those definitional 
practices. The range of ‘acceptable behaviour in the 
public space’ was transformed radically as municipal au-
thorities now obtained the responsibility and the com-
petence to partially define both its range and content.  
The LAP’s regulate citizens’ behaviour in a way that 
differs qualitatively from the disciplinary and the bio-
political technique, in that the former intervenes on 
the individual without restricting itself to a limited in-
stitutional setting. This can be illustrated by the case of 
the shop owners in Antwerp’s Main Street wanting to 
get rid of beggars and homeless people in what they 
consider to be ‘their’ street. In federal legislation beg-
ging is not forbidden and for some beggars, the activity 
may be a substantial strategy to obtain an income. 
However, the shop owners perceived begging to be a 
form of nuisance, and managed to persuade the local 
authorities not to tolerate such behaviour. Instead of 
police officers starting a juridical procedure again and 
again, LAP officials could fine the beggars much easier 
and seemingly more effectively, as the beggars did dis-
appear from Antwerp’s Main Street. In terms of etho-
politics, the beggars probably internalized the required 
dispositions as they not only evaded the Main Street 
but other popular shopping areas as well. Unlike disci-
plinary power techniques, the LAP’s are not bound to 
any one particular place: the fines could be distributed 
everywhere. The risk of being fined is ubiquitous and in 
this sense ‘virtual’: the eyes of the regulating power 
seem to be patrolling permanently. Wherever the beg-
gar goes, his mere presence and activity may suffice to 
be accused as committing an offence. As beggars may 
choose for even more anonymity, the LAP’s can be 
considered to be effective not only in fighting nuisanc-
es but also in making some people more invisible. This 
may (re)produce a new articulation of inequality for 
the societal means to label what should be treated as 
nuisance, as some are granted a legitimate ‘voice’, 
whereas others are not. In combination with the etho-
political techniques, the already existent inequalities 
may therefore reinforce themselves. Not all citizens 
can thus realize their right to the city and its amenities; 
this right seems to become more conditional, bound to 
specific behaviours that get labelled ‘normal’. 
4. Conclusion and Discussion 
In this article we explored how some policy measures 
endorsed by Antwerp’s municipal government be-
tween 2003 and 2012, can be interpreted as power 
techniques intended to regulate the behaviour, life-
styles and identities of its citizens. To round up this 
contribution we will go one step further by identifying 
what we think is the key thread running through these 
policy measures. In this section we will, in other words, 
sketch the general ‘governmental rationality’ emerging 
from particular uses of the power techniques described 
above. In doing so, we will situate the logic underlying 
Antwerp’s governance within broader political philo-
sophical discussions on citizenship.  
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We argue that Antwerp’s governance shared a 
number of key characteristics with the ‘liberal’ tradi-
tion in political philosophy. According to liberal philos-
ophers such as John Rawls or Isaiah Berlin governments 
should only interfere with their members’ behaviour if 
that behaviour forms a threat to the universal freedom 
of other members. Individuals are, to put it differently, 
free to live and develop their identities as they please, 
without fear of the state imposing its preference for 
any particular conception of a ‘good’ citizen. In this 
vein, Antwerp’s municipality legitimized its policy 
measures pertaining to beggars, civil servants and so-
cial housing in the name of a universal good and the 
protection of the free individual. This general vision on 
urban citizenship was summarized symbolically by the 
new city slogan: ‘The city belongs to everyone’.  
In spite of this inclusive rhetoric, a number of ten-
sions inherent to such liberal universalist accounts 
arose. These tensions can be clarified by invoking two 
recurring critiques of philosophical liberalism. Firstly, 
communitarian authors such as Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Michael Walzer have argued that all conceptions of cit-
izenship, even liberal ones, are inevitably rooted in 
specific cultural-historical contexts. With respect to 
Antwerp, this became clear when we analysed the con-
crete techniques the municipality used to put its uni-
versalist, inclusive conception of citizenship into prac-
tice. The three policy measures analysed in this article 
all used power techniques enforcing and therefore as-
suming a particular ‘normal’ conduct for its citizens. As 
a result, a new topography of inclusion and exclusion 
emerged: ‘normal’ ways of behaving or displaying 
one’s identity were distinguished from their ‘deviant’ 
counterparts. 
Interestingly, these distinguishing and normalizing 
practices were generally legitimated by invoking a uni-
versalist, inclusive reasoning. The city officials’ dress 
code forbidding the display of religious symbols was 
not legitimized by referring to a particular conception 
of a Flemish or autochthonous identity, but rather by 
referring to the secular, a-cultural nature of the state. 
In practice, however, this meant that only a small mi-
nority of the civil servants had to adjust their appear-
ance to the new institutional context, thus establishing 
the majority of individuals not wearing religious sym-
bols as the general norm. Similarly, the municipal gov-
ernment sought to obtain a more ideally ‘mixed’ urban 
population by attracting high-profile residents and by 
gently pushing out the poorer, often ‘coloured’, seg-
ments of its citizenry. And in a different vein, the LAP’s 
formally prescribed detailed rules of conduct for public 
spaces, thereby establishing what was to be the right 
behaviour in particular public spaces. Out of many, the 
example was given of begging in a popular shopping 
street, which from then on was considered to be inap-
propriate for the economic function of that space. 
Secondly, republican and democratic authors such 
as Hannah Arendt, Iris Marion Young and Chantal 
Mouffe have argued that a liberal, universalist concep-
tion of the political community neutralizes the conflicts 
between different groups and individuals, whereas in 
reality they compete with one another for a place in 
the public sphere. Whether the municipality was deal-
ing with civil servants wearing headscarves, beggars in 
a shopping area, or people from lower socioeconomic 
classes searching for an affordable place to live: the 
three of them were invariably excluded from specific 
parts of the public sphere in name of a broader, uni-
versal good. The struggle between such groups to be-
long to that public sphere was taken out of  the pic-
ture, to improve the general appeal of the city. The 
image created by the municipality was one of a public 
order without conflicts, a transparent public sphere 
without groups competing with one another. The LAP-
fines emerged out of the intention to guarantee a 
more ‘liveable’ public order: the sanctions in the shop-
ping street were not considered to be the final result of 
a struggle between shop owners, consumers and beg-
gars as equal members of the political community. The 
ban on visibly wearing religious and cultural symbols 
for front-office civil servants was considered to be a 
precondition of a neutral, tolerant government, rather 
than the result of a cultural struggle for recognition be-
tween a majority and its minorities. And, in a similar 
vein, the city’s housing policy was no longer seen as a 
competition between rich and poor for the right to live 
in the city centre, but as a technical affair which can 
(and has to be) dealt with in a formal way, based on 
mathematical equations that pre-empt any public de-
bate.  
The implications of this double critique on the lib-
eral, universalist conception of political citizenship be-
came clear by examining the policy techniques that 
were used by the municipal government. The key 
thread running through these policy techniques, we ar-
gue, is that the city should be made as ‘liveable’ and at-
tractive as possible for the highest common denomina-
tor: the city belongs to everyone. From our reading, 
however, it appears that this universality is (inevitably) 
highly conditional when put into practice: in every of 
the three policy techniques the municipality used a 
specific conception of what the ‘normal’ conduct of its 
individual members ought to be. The interests of the 
majority of people who made use of the city are there-
by given priority vis-à-vis those of the deviant minori-
ties. In others words, the city belongs just a little bit 
more to those who behave, live or express themselves 
appropriately. 
In October 2012, Patrick Janssens lost the municipal 
elections to Bart De Wever and his New-Flemish Alli-
ance. The newly elected majority identified itself with a 
markedly different rhetoric, prolifically replacing the 
old, universalist slogan by the more demanding ‘Re-
spect for A(ntwerp)’. Interestingly though, while the 
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overt rhetoric seemed to undergo a profound trans-
formation, the power techniques established by the 
previous majority remained in place. From an Urban 
Politics perspective, the continuity between the former 
and the current municipality’s construction of citizen-
ship may appear as something of a strange anomaly. 
From a Foucauldian perspective, however, we have 
been able to distinguish between the rhetoric dis-
played by those in power, and the actual techniques 
deployed to regulate citizenship in practice. Focussing 
on ‘how’ citizenship—and thereby, ethnicity—is regu-
lated serves as an enriching complement to existing 
studies of urban politics. As it turns out, to become one 
of Antwerp’s true citizens, substantially more is re-
quired than simply being granted the right legal status. 
As both mayors have taught their citizens, it is at least 
as important to behave and live up to the city’s stand-
ards. 
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